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INTRODUCTION

Spacious skies, amber waves of grain, and purple mountain majesties1—these
words recall iconic images of the environment that American citizens know and
love. But the environmental justice movement views the environment in a much
more simple way—it defines the environment by the various everyday places where
Americans “live, work and play.”2 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
describes that the goal of the environmental justice movement is to obtain “the fair
treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color,
national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”3 The environmental
justice movement implicates principles from traditional environmentalism—such as
preservation and conservation of natural resources—but applies them with respect to
people. Specifically, environmental justice is concerned with preserving the quality
of life in communities that face disproportionately high levels of pollution from the
disparate enforcement of environmental laws.4
1

KATHARINE LEE BATES, AMERICA THE BEAUTIFUL AND OTHER POEMS 3 (1911).

2

PATRICK NOVOTNY, WHERE WE LIVE, WORK AND P LAY: THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
MOVEMENT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW ENVIRONMENTALISM 3 (2000).
3

Environmental Justice, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/environmental
justice/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2010). The EPA defines fair treatment to mean that “no group of
people should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences
resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial operations or policies.” Basic
Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmental
justice/basics/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). The EPA defines meaningful
involvement to mean:
1. [P]eople have an opportunity to participate in decisions about activities that may
affect their environment and/or health;
2. the public’s contribution can influence the regulatory agency’s decision;
3. their concerns will be considered in the decision making process; and
4. the decision makers seek out and facilitate the involvement of those potentially
affected.
Id.
4

It is important to reiterate that environmental justice issues do not arise as the result of
illegal acts, or violations of environmental laws or policies, but simply from the inequitable
enforcement of environmental laws. Furthermore, environmental injustice does not always
arise from malicious or intentional discriminatory decisions and can simply be the result of a
lack of foresight. For example, one of the most horrendous environmental disasters and
examples of environmental injustice in Love Canal, New York gained national attention in the
late 1970s. Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, EPA JOURNAL, January 1979,
available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/01.htm. Commonly referred to as
the “Love Canal tragedy,” residents in this small town in upstate New York were victims of
severe toxic waste poisoning when the city built houses and a school on land that had
previously been a hazardous waste dump. Id. The previous owners of the dump had covered
up the waste with dirt and sold the land for one dollar, but the true costs were much more
crippling. Leeching chemicals and toxic wastes from the dump caused many birth defects,
and the quality of life plummeted. Id. One reporter explained that, “[p]uddles of noxious
substances were . . . in their yards, some were in their basements, others yet were on the
school grounds. Everywhere the air had a faint, choking smell. Children returned from play
with burns on their hands and faces.” Id. Subsequent environmental regulations—such as the
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The environmental justice movement’s focus on the human impact of
environmental regulations requires more than merely writing and enforcing a
uniform and static policy like those found in purely environmental regulations.
Continually gathering data, providing opportunities for public participation, and
providing the means to ensure equitable enforcement of environmental laws is the
basis for effective environmental justice regulations.5 While the purpose and goals
of the environmental justice movement borrow heavily from the areas of
environmental and civil rights law,6 neither field encourages continual governmental
responsiveness nor relies on dynamic regulation procedures to achieve its goals. The
success of the environmental justice movement, however, depends on having
dynamic regulatory framework and government that will respond to results of new
data and the desires of the public. Currently, there are no formal policies or
regulations in place to achieve environmental justice. Therefore, environmental
justice plaintiffs rarely succeed in obtaining recovery for their injuries. In the
absence of any formal environmental justice regulations in the United States, this
Note proposes a new model statute, to be implemented at the state level, that uses
data collection and public participation to achieve environmental justice, equitable
enforcement of environmental laws, and the fair distribution of pollution.
Over the years, little has been done to provide legal remedies for victims of
environmental injustice. Although the EPA has recognized environmental justice as
a nation-wide problem, its attention to the movement consistently falls short of any
formal or legally enforceable regulations.7 Similarly, state and local environmental
justice strategies do not have the force of law, and do little to regulate, enforce, or
ensure environmental justice. In 2009, however, the City of Cincinnati passed an
Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Toxic Substances
Control Act—seek to prevent future environmental tragedies like Love Canal. Id. But
environmental regulations do not address problems that have already occurred, nor do they
consider the forward-looking issues of discrimination and equitable enforcement. For
example, in the 1990s, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP)
granted a permit for a cement manufacturing company under the Clean Air Act. S. Camden
Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 450-51 (D.N.J. 2001).
The community had already been burdened by two Superfund sites and fifteen contaminated
hazardous waste sites, yet the proposed facility would have emitted various pollutants—
including mercury, lead, and carbon monoxide—into the air. Id. at 450. The NJDEP granted
this permit in spite of the “pre-existing poor health of the residents” and “the cumulative
environmental burden already borne by this impoverished community.” Id. at 451. Therefore,
even legal permitting decisions can result in the inequitable distribution of pollution.
5

See infra Part III.A.

6
Tseming Yang, Melding Civil Rights and Environmentalism: Finding Environmental
Justice’s Place in Environmental Regulation, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002). To a
certain extent, civil rights and environmental law overlap, making it a sound basis for
environmental justice policies. Id. However, environmental regulations are premised on the
idea of enhancing the majority’s preferences for environmental reform, whereas civil rights
laws are premised on the idea of protecting underrepresented populations from majoritarian
pressures. Id. at 4. Where these two premises diverge, conflicts in how to regulate
environmental justice occur. Id. at 3. Therefore, the environmental justice movement must be
viewed independently from the environmental and civil rights movements in order to achieve
its own unique goals.
7

See infra Part II.A.3.
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Environmental Justice Ordinance (“the Ordinance”),8 the first of its kind in the
country to create regulation and enforcement measures specifically to achieve
environmental justice.9 The Ordinance, written in response to air pollution problems
in the City of Cincinnati, utilizes data collection and public participation procedures
to prevent further degradation of the environment across the city. Additionally, the
Ordinance addresses one of the major shortcomings of other environmental justice
regulations by increasing the local government’s accountability for its permit
decisions, and therefore serves as a model for future environmental justice
regulations.10
The majority of environmental justice policies today exist as extremely
decentralized municipal ordinances or as extremely centralized government agency
strategies. Each system of regulation presents distinct advantages.11 Therefore, an
analysis of the Ordinance within the context of the ongoing debate between the
benefits of centralized versus decentralized environmental regulations (the
centralization-decentralization debate)12 examines the advantages of each scheme of
regulations more extensively. However, each argument in favor of one type of
regulation represents a disadvantage of the other, so this Note argues that by
implementing environmental justice regulations at the state level, with the Cincinnati
Ordinance as a model, the benefits of both local and national policies can be
combined while mitigating the relative disadvantages.
To illustrate the inadequacies of both federal and local level attempts to achieve
environmental justice, Part II of this Note canvasses a brief history of the
environmental justice movement at the federal, state, and local levels, including a
description of the specific provisions of the Ordinance. As the history of the
movement will show, neither the federal, state, nor local level governments provide
effective or efficient legal remedies for environmental justice. However, state
administrative agencies, whose regulatory authority mirrors those at the federal
level, have the flexibility to expand their environmental justice policies with the
cooperation of state legislatures. Part III of this Note then provides an analysis of
the Ordinance regarding the effectiveness of its provisions in achieving the goals of
the environmental justice movement. The Ordinance provides an effective model for
future environmental justice policies because it enhances government accountability.
Additionally, Part III analyzes the Ordinance with respect to the centralizationdecentralization debate. Theoretically, environmental justice regulations can be
promulgated at any level of government—either by the national government as the
supreme law of the land or under the state and local police powers. However, an
analysis of the Ordinance within the context of the centralization-decentralization
debate is necessary to show that practical considerations weigh in favor of neither

8

CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).

9

David C. Crowley, Vice Mayor Crowley on Environmental Justice Ordinance, THE
CINCINNATI BEACON, June 30, 2009, available at http://www.cincinnatibeacon.com/
index.php?/contents/comments/vice_mayor_crowley_on_environmental_justice_ordinance/.
10

See infra Part III.A.

11

See infra Part III.B.3.

12

See infra Part III.B.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss1/8

4

2011]

THE CINCINNATI ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORDINANCE

227

local nor national environmental just policies, but for regulations at the state level
instead.
II. A HISTORY OF THE GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
During the environmental movement in the 1970s, evidence indicated that poor
and minority urban populations suffered more from environmental hazards, yet the
environmental movement focused primarily on preservation, conservation, and
environmental aesthetics rather than public health or the potential impact of pollution
on overburdened communities.13 Therefore, environmental justice advocates,
seeking to remedy the pollution disparities suffered by low-income and minority
communities, searched for legal remedies outside of the environmental movement.
Due to the minority-majority demographics of many communities facing
environmental hazards and being overburdened with pollution, grassroots organizers
turned towards strategies from the Civil Rights movement.14 Unfortunately, neither
environmental nor civil rights laws have provided adequate remedies for
environmental justice claims, and all levels of government agencies have been
reluctant to adopt mandatory environmental justice regulations. The Ordinance,
however, provides mandatory environmental justice regulations specifically written
to achieve the movement’s goals.
A. Environmental Justice at the Federal Level
1. Legislating Environmental Justice
The environmental justice movement derives its goals from both the
environmental and civil rights movements. Both those movements achieved great
successes when federal statutes provided plaintiffs with causes of action.
Accordingly, in the early 1990s, two legislative efforts aimed to address
environmental justice by regulating the distribution of new facilities in order to
prevent individual communities from suffering from disproportionately high
pollution levels.15
In 1992, Representative John Lewis and Senator Al Gore
introduced the “Environmental Justice Act of 1992.”16 This statute sought “to help
those people who face the greatest risk of exposure to toxic substances and
pollution”17 by identifying “environmental high impact areas.”18 It also imposed a
13

OUR BACKYARD: A QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 6 (Gerald R. Visgilio & Diana
M. Whitelaw eds., 2003).
14

Id. at 7. Principles from the Civil Rights movement were invoked in the famous Warren
County protests, a series of non-violent protests in opposition to the North Carolina
governor’s decision to dispose hazardous soil in a predominantly African American
community. Id.
15
Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based
Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 352-53 (1995).
16

Environmental Justice Act of 1992, H.R. 2806, 102d Cong. (1992); Environmental
Justice Act of 1992, S. 2806, 102d Cong. (1992). See Mank, supra note 15, at 353 (providing
background information on the proposed environmental justice legislation).
17
138 CONG. REC. S7 489 (1992) (statement of Sen. Gore); Claire L. Hasler, Comment,
The Proposed Environmental Justice Act: “I Have a (Green) Dream,” 17 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 417, 417 (1994).
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moratorium on siting or permitting any new facility in a high impact area.19
However, the legislation died in committee hearings.20 Just the next year, another
congressional environmental justice statute met the same fate.21
Since these two legislative attempts, Congress has not proposed any other
environmental justice statutes. Therefore, environmental justice plaintiffs must seek
remedies under already existing civil rights and environmental laws.
2. Suing for Environmental Justice
Without statutes specifically written to provide environmental justice remedies,
plaintiffs are restricted to pursuing environmental justice under civil rights and
environmental laws. Although environmental justice incorporated principles from
both bodies of law, neither area of law specifically addresses the goals of
environmental justice, and the courts have imposed strict standards that often bar
recovery on environmental justice claims.
Due to the disproportionate rate at which low-income and minority communities
are burdened with environmental hazards, environmental justice plaintiffs may
pursue claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22
Typically, these claims allege the government discriminated against racial minorities
in its decision to site polluting facilities in a low-income or minority neighborhood.23
However, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause must prove that the discriminatory intent motivated the
governmental action.24 Under this standard, it is insufficient to simply prove that the
government’s actions had a discriminatory effect.25

18

Mank, supra note 15, at 353.

19

Id.

20

Hasler, supra note 17, at 445.

21

Id. The Environmental Justice Act of 1993 was designed to “establish a program to
assure nondiscriminatory compliance with all environmental, health and safety laws and to
assure equal protection of the public health.” Id. The 1993 act would have functioned very
similar to the Environmental Justice Act of 1992, requiring “EPA to publish a list of
geographic areas with the highest amounts of toxic chemicals. It would require EPA to
inspect all toxic chemical facilities operating in Environmentally High Impact Areas (EHIAs)
and impose a moratorium on the siting of new chemical facilities in EHIAs.” EPA09:
Establish a Blueprint for Environmental Justice Throughout EPA’s Operations, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/reports/EPA9 .html (last
visited Nov. 9, 2010).
22
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
23

Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1979).

24

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Uma Outka, Comment, Environmental
Injustice and the Problem of the Law, 57 M E. L. REV. 209, 218 (2005).
25

Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.

[A] law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of the
government to pursue, is [not] invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply
because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.
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Similarly, the Supreme Court applies a strict standard to environmental justice
claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of Title VI
prohibits discrimination by programs and governmental entities, such as state
environmental agencies, that receive funding from the federal government.26
Therefore, citizens can sue state programs and attack policies and decisions on
discrimination grounds.27 However, as with claims under the Equal Protection
Clause, individual section 601 claims require proof of intentional government
discrimination, a standard that often bars recovery.28
An even more limited avenue for recovery exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
creates a cause of action for any person who is deprived of a federal right guaranteed
by the laws and Constitution of the United States.29 A § 1983 cause of action only
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of . . .
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.
Id.; see also Outka, supra note 24, at 218. The devastating effect this standard had on
environmental justice cases is illustrated by Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.
Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 673. In Bean, plaintiffs presented statistical evidence that two-thirds of
all solid waste dumps in the Houston metropolitan area were placed in predominantly AfricanAmerican communities. Id. at 678. However, because of the fact that the Texas Department
of Health, the agency responsible for siting decisions, did not grant permits to all of the dumps
cited in the statistical data, that evidence did not meet plaintiffs’ burden of proving
discriminatory intent by the Department. Id. at 677-78.
26

Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2006).

27

Outka, supra note 24, at 223. Specifically, Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act
establishes that no person “on the ground of race, color, or national origin, [shall] be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601.
28

Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y. 463 U.S. 582, 582 (1983) (holding in a
plurality decision that unless discriminatory intent is shown, declaratory and limited injunctive
relief should be the only available private remedies for Title VI violations); see also Outka,
supra note 24, at 223. Additionally, Section 602 of the Civil Rights Act gives funding
agencies the power to require recipients of federal money to develop regulations to implement
Section 601. But the Supreme Court held that Congress does not create a “freestanding
private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602” in the absence of clear
intent within the statute to create such a right. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293
(2001). Applying the Court’s holding from Sandoval, the Third Circuit denied recovery for an
obvious case of environmental injustice in Camden, New Jersey. S. Camden Citizens in
Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001). In South Camden, the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection granted a permit for a cement grinding plant
in a poor minority community whose residents were already burdened with “two Superfund
sites, several contaminated and abandoned industrial sites, and many currently operating . . .
chemical companies, waste facilities, food processing companies, automotive shops, and a
petroleum coke transfer station” and faced the approved development of a sewage treatment
plant, trash incinerator, and power plant. Id. at 775. The district court had granted relief to
the citizens group on the basis of disparate impact from the multiple polluting facilities in the
city, but on appeal the Third Circuit reiterated that the statute proscribes only intentional
discrimination. Id. at 774.
29

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . .
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exists when: the alleged statutory violation is also a violation of a federal right
intended to benefit the plaintiff; the plaintiff can demonstrate that the protected right
is not “‘vague and amorphous’”; and that protection of the right is mandatory under
the federal statute.30 Holding that only Congress can create a federal right by a
statutory mandate, the Court found that EPA regulations providing freedom from
disparate impact of environmental decisions are valid but do not create a federal
right beyond the scope of the statute.31 Therefore, EPA regulations provided for
freedom from disparate impact of pollution, but the regulations did not create a cause
of action under § 1983 because the regulations are “‘too far removed from
Congressional intent to constitute a federal right’” by statutory mandate.32
3. Establishing Environmental Justice Agency Policies
Unlike Congress and the courts, which have continually failed to address
environmental justice concerns, federal executive agencies have authorized
numerous policies and strategies to promote environmental justice. Before engaging
in any rule making or policy making decision, the executive agencies responded to
claims of environmental justice by conducting studies in order to either substantiate
or refute claims of environmental injustice.33 Finding that these studies supported
environmental justice claims, executive agencies began addressing environmental
justice concerns.34 The EPA, for example, formed the Environmental Equity
Workgroup to generate its own study regarding the issues surrounding
environmental justice.35 The EPA study concluded that environmental injustice
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . . .
Id.
30

S. Camden, 274 F.3d at 779 (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997)).

31

Id. at 790.

32

Id. (citing Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1009 (11th Cir. 1997)).

33

OUR B ACKYARD, supra note 13, at 8. The GAO report was commissioned by two
congressmen, one of whom was arrested for participating in the Warren County protests. Id.
United Church of Christ, whose members played a major role in organizing the Warren
County protests, commissioned a study that further supported a finding of environmental
injustice by the GAO report. Id.
34
Many government offices now have environmental justice policies, strategies, or
guidance documents.
EJ IWG Compendium, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/ environmentaljustice/interagency/iwg-compendium.html (last visited
Nov. 28, 2010). In addressing environmental justice issues, a department may establish its
own strategies, or it may collaborate with other departments and agencies through the Federal
Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice (EJ IWG). Id. Executive Order 12,898
created the EJ IWG, with the purpose to improve federal environmental justice efforts by
coordinating policies of fifteen federal agencies and numerous other White House offices.
Federal Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/ environmentaljustice/interagency/iwg-compendium.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2011).
35
Basic Information: Background, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/environmentaljustice/basics/ejbackground.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
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manifested itself primarily through disproportionate siting of polluting facilities and
hazardous waste facilities in minority communities.36 As a result, the EPA also
concluded that environmental justice needed to be a priority for the agency.37
At the same time that Congress was deliberating the Environmental Justice Act,
the EPA independently started to create procedures for addressing the causes of
environmental injustice.
Following through on the recommendations of the
Environmental Equity Workgroup, the EPA created the Office of Environmental
Justice in 1992.38 In 1993, the EPA declared environmental justice to be a guiding
principle of its strategic plan to reduce the disproportionately high amount of
pollution and hazardous waste facilities in minority communities.39 In 1994,
President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898, which was “designed to focus
Federal attention on the environmental and human health conditions in minority
communities and low-income communities with the goal of achieving environmental
justice.”40 Executive Order 12,898 affirmed the work being done by agencies such
as the EPA to promote environmental justice despite the frustrations experienced in
the legislative and judicial branches of government. Executive Order 12,898 requires
the EPA and its regional offices to consider environmental justice issues in all of its
permitting decisions.41 Therefore, as a result of Executive Order 12,898, the EPA
continually updates its strategic plan for environmental justice. However, neither the
strategic plan nor the President’s Executive Order creates any binding requirements
for the agencies to implement or enforce environmental justice policies.
Furthermore, an evaluation in 2006 by the Office of the General Inspector of the
EPA confirmed that EPA programs and regional offices failed to conduct
environmental justice reviews required by Executive Order 12,898 in order to
36
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL
COMMUNITIES 26 (1992), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/
resources/reports/annual-project-reports.html.
37

Id.

38

Basic Information: Background, supra note 35. Originally the Office of Environmental
Equity, created in 1992, the name was changed to its present form in 1994. Id. The Office of
Environmental Justice coordinates and oversees all of EPA’s environmental justice policies,
as well as managing EPA’s financial resources to ensure that it can achieve the EPA’s
objectives. Id.
39
A strategic plan explains the EPA’s strategic goals to advance its environmental and
human-health mission. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FY 2011-2015: EPA STRATEGIC P LAN 1
(2010). The current strategic plan identifies working towards environmental justice as one of
the EPA’s “Cross-Cutting Fundamental Strategies” that will change the way in which EPA
approaches its work. Id.
40

Memorandum on Executive Order on Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice
in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, 1 PUB. PAPERS 241 (Feb. 11, 1994).
The Executive Order provided that each federal agency must develop environmental justice
strategies in order to provide a framework for analyzing the disparate impact of environmental
hazards from their programs, policies, and activities. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg.
7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). The Executive Order also created the Interagency Working group to
work on collaborative projects and coordinate efforts by government agencies and other White
House offices. Id.
41

Richard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice Into EPA
Permitting Authority, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 617, 650 (1999).
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“identify and address disproportionately high and adverse health or environmental
effects on minority and low-income populations.”42
Recently, however, the EPA Administrator, Lisa Jackson, refocused the agency
on incorporating environmental justice objectives into its projects through two new
initiatives. First, the EPA introduced “Plan EJ 2014,” a comprehensive strategy to
be used as a roadmap for integrating environmental justice into all of EPA’s
programs.43 The Administrator intends for Plan EJ 2014 to protect overburdened
communities from further harm and empower those communities to actively improve
their health and environment by establishing partnerships with government
organizations.44 Second, the EPA is in the process of revising its guidelines for
considering environmental justice during the rulemaking process.45 These internal
guidelines help EPA staff to determine whether a permitting decision raises
environmental justice concerns and how to address those issues.46 In spite of the
positive reactions to Plan EJ 2014 and the EPA’s new guidelines, these initiatives are
reminiscent of earlier “strategies” and “objectives” that do not have the force of law
and are not binding on agency actions.47
Therefore, although the federal executive branch has not ignored the issue of
environmental justice, neither has it provided remedies for victims of environmental
injustice. Instead of promulgating agency regulations providing environmental
justice plaintiffs with causes of action under environmental laws, the EPA merely
requires “consideration” of environmental justice issues.48 Therefore, within the
framework of the federal government, environmental justice plaintiffs have very
limited avenues for recovery.
B. Environmental Justice at the State Level
Federal environmental laws do not only give federal agencies regulatory
authority over environmental issues, but they also delegate certain decision-making
42

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT NO. 2006-P-00034, EPA NEEDS TO CONDUCT
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE REVIEWS OF ITS PROGRAMS, POLICIES, AND ACTIVITIES 3 (September
18, 2006), available at www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2006/20060918-2006-P-00034.pdf.
43
Plan EJ 2014, U.S. ENVTL. P ROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/
environmentaljustice/resources/policy/plan-ej-2014.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
44

Id.

45

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: INTERIM
GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN
ACTION i (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/
resources/policy/ej-rulemaking.html.
46

Id. at ii.

47

Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“[I]nterpretations contained in
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all . . . lack the force of
law.”).
48
Lazarus & Tai, supra note 41, at 651. Although Executive Order 12,898 requires the
EPA and its regional offices to consider environmental justice issues, a guidance document
from EPA Region V explicitly states that “‘[t]he appropriate response to a finding of
disproportionate effect will rarely be permit denial; and this should be clearly explained to the
public.’” Id. at 652.
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powers to state administrative agencies.49 The authority to grant permits for new
polluting facilities is one aspect of environmental regulation that federal
environmental statutes have delegated to the states.50 However, because there is no
federal environmental justice statute requiring or setting standards for environmental
justice concerns, any environmental justice regulations by state agencies must be
instituted at the discretion of the state legislature. States have different approaches
to environmental justice, and some proactive legislatures have developed
environmental justice strategies.51
Ohio, like many other states, has assumed permitting authority under several
different environmental laws. For example, the state legislature delegated to the
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (“Ohio EPA”) permitting authority under
the federal Clean Air Act,52 Clean Water Act,53 and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (“RCRA”).54 And, to the extent that any federal statutes implement
environmental justice policies, the Ohio EPA has the authority to consider those
issues in the permitting process. For example, the director of Ohio EPA may rescind
or amend any solid waste facility permits that “create a nuisance” or “create a health
hazard.”55
However, because federal environmental laws do not require
consideration of environmental justice issues, the state agencies, like the Ohio EPA,
that obtain environmental regulatory power are likewise not required to consider
environmental justice issues.
Much like the federal EPA, the state administrative agencies have discretion over
whether to initiate environmental justice regulations. In spite of their ability to enact
formal environmental justice policies and regulations, however, most states decline
the opportunity to do so, limiting their initiatives to strategies that rarely result in

49
State agencies, like other administrative agencies at the federal level, are created by
statute and obtain delegated power from enabling legislation. Gregory C. Ward, Lussier v.
Maryland Racing Commission: Maryland’s Court of Appeals Upholds a Fine Imposed by an
Administrative Agency Despite a Lack of Specific Authorization to Fine From the General
Assembly, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 515, 516 (1998).
50

Panel Tells U.S. EPA to Make Environmental Justice a Larger Concern, 13 BUS. & THE
ENV’T 15 (2002). For example, in 2000, state and local environmental agencies issued 99% of
all air permits, 96% of all wastewater discharge permits, and 98% of all waste permits. Id.
The trend of states taking over permitting regulations, therefore, shows that the states have a
strong interest in regulating environmental issues. However, the states have traditionally been
less concerned with promoting civil rights as with protecting the environment. Yang, supra
note 6, at 28. This “schizophrenic” tension in state authority presents another shortcoming of
the existing approach to environmental justice regulations, which relies exclusively on
borrowing from environmental and civil rights law. Id.
51
Clifford Rechtschaffen, Strategies for Implementing the Environmental Justice Vision, 1
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 321, 321-22 (2007).
52

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3704.03 (West 2010).

53
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6111.021(A) (West 2010); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
6111.01(L) (West 2010) (defining the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to mean the act as
amended by the Clean Water Act).
54

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.02(E)(3)(b) (West 2010).

55

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.02 (West 2010).
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formal or legally enforceable regulations.56 Therefore, victims of environmental
injustice are left without a cause of action under both federal and state laws.
C. Environmental Justice at the Local Level
Although municipalities and local governments have more limited power than
state or federal governments, they often act as laboratories of experimentation for
new laws and regulations.57 Due to the lack of available remedies and enforcement
mechanisms for environmental justice at the federal and state levels, environmental
justice advocates typically have fought for environmental justice regulations through
nonprofit advocacy organizations. But one of the most recent examples of
environmental justice advocacy, the Environmental Justice ordinance58 passed by the
City of Cincinnati in 2009, diverges from traditional environmental justice advocacy
and represents an innovation of environmental justice regulations using municipal
police power to regulate and enforce environmental justice principles.59
56

Rechtschaffen, supra note 51, at 322. The California legislature, known for being
progressive and environmentally friendly, has passed environmental justice statutes and an
environmental justice strategy. Id. However, even the California Environmental Protection
Agency “has yet to adopt any substantive environmental justice regulations.” Id.
57
Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical
Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 246 (2000) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Justice Brandeis noted the important role
of small governments within the federal system as laboratories for experimentation,
explaining:

Some people assert that our present plight is due, in part, to the limitations set by
courts upon experimentation in the fields of social and economic science; and to the
discouragement to which proposals for betterment there have been subjected
otherwise. There must be power in the states and the nation to remould, through
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and
economic needs . . . . It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 310-11.
58

CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041 (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).

59
See generally OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (granting a municipal corporation the ability
to use its police power to protect the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public);
City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 49 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ohio 1943). A related issue, but outside the
scope of this article, is whether the Ordinance, as a municipal ordinance, would be preempted
by state or federal law. As a brief introduction to the topic, in Ohio, municipal laws enacted
under the police power must not “conflict with general laws.” OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
General laws are ones that operate “‘uniformly throughout the state . . . which prescribe a rule
of conduct upon citizens generally, and which operate with general uniform application
throughout the state under the same circumstances and conditions.’” Village of Sheffield v.
Rowland, 716 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (Ohio 1999) (quoting Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass’n,
407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980)). To determine whether a municipal ordinance conflicts with a
general law of the state, the courts will ask “‘whether the ordinance permits or licenses that
which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.’” Id. (quoting Struthers v. Sokol, 140
N.E. 519 (Ohio 1923)). Therefore, an analysis of state preemption of the Ordinance would
require determining whether state environmental permitting laws are general laws of the state,
and then whether the Ordinance, which adds additional permitting requirements, is in conflict.
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The Ordinance, the first of its kind in the nation, has created a new model for
environmental justice regulation.60 Numerous reports and studies indicated the poor
air quality and high pollution levels in the Cincinnati area,61 and still more studies
indicated the adverse health effects of such pollutants on the general public.62
Therefore, under the authority of the police power to “protect[] the citizenry from
material, cumulative adverse impacts on health or the environment,” the City
Council of the City of Cincinnati enacted the Environmental Justice ordinance (“the
Ordinance”) on June 24, 2009.63
The City Council based the Ordinance on the basic environmental justice
principle of providing the fair treatment and meaningful involvement to all people
under environmental laws,64 and added the goals of eliminating the adverse health
effects caused by air contaminants and removing the threat of serious or permanent
harm from local industrial accidents.65 Implementing these goals, the Ordinance
requires any “proposed project” to obtain an environmental justice permit in order to
operate within the city.66 A proposed project must submit information regarding the
type of facility and the activities that will be conducted there, as well as a detailed
risk analysis of the impact on the community within a one-mile radius of the
proposed project.67 An appointed city official (the Examiner) must then review the
Federal preemption, on the other hand, can occur either by express preemption or field
preemption. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 634 (1973). In
the case of field preemption, the Supreme Court will assume that the States’ historic police
powers are not superseded by a federal law unless “that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.” Id. Therefore, to determine whether a conflict between local or federal law exists,
the court must consider congressional intent.
60

Crowley, supra note 9.

61

CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041 (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). The
City Council’s resolution passing the Ordinance cited the American Lung Association’s 2009
“State of the Air” Report listing Cincinnati as the eighth worst for particulate pollution and the
fifteenth worst for ozone pollution among metropolitan areas in the nation. Cincinnati
Environmental Justice, CINCINNATI OFF. OF ENVTL. QUALITY http://www.cincinnatioh.gov/cmgr/pages/-17684-/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2009).
62

Cincinnati Environmental Justice, supra note 61. The Hamilton County Department of
Environmental Services (HCDOES) collected data showing residents in the Cincinnati area
faced cancer risks of more than ten in one million. Id. The cancer risk in Cincinnati greatly
exceeds the federal standard of one in one million adopted by multiple federal agencies,
including the EPA. Id. The HCDOES study is supported by the EPA’s National Air Toxics
Assessment Report, which concluded that the pollution levels in the Cincinnati air yielded
cancer risks ranging from 30 in one million to 180 in one million. Id.
63

Id. at 18.

64

CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-3 (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).

65

Cincinnati Environmental Justice, supra note 61, at 4-5.

66

CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-5-F (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). A
proposed project is any activity for which a permit must be obtained from either the Ohio EPA
or federal EPA under numerous other environmental laws. CINCINNATI OH., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 1041-5-L (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).
67

CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-5-B (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).
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information and grant a proposed project an environmental justice permit if it will
not have a “‘material, cumulative adverse impact’” on human health or the
environment in the community.68 Therefore, this ordinance provides, for the first
time, the legal authority for a permit to be denied solely for environmental justice
reasons.
Many nonprofit and local organizations in the Cincinnati area supported enacting
the Ordinance.69 However, the city council faced—and continues to struggle
against—opposition from local businesses and industry leaders.70 Specifically, the
Cincinnati Regional Chamber of Commerce objected to the Ordinance because it
would impede economic development in the city and asserted the City could not
afford the costs associated with the new administrative procedures.71 Although the
City Council overcame the objections from the Chamber of Commerce and other
industrial leaders and passed the Ordinance, implementation of the ordinance had to
be delayed for lack of funding in the budget. The new effective date of the
Ordinance, February 1, 2011, remains contingent upon available funding in the city’s
budget.72
Within the context of environmental justice policies at the federal, state, and
local levels, the Ordinance presents a new and revolutionary system for addressing,
enforcing, and ensuring the goals of environmental justice by conditioning permits
solely on environmental justice factors.73 However, as a municipal ordinance, the
reality of the financial constraints of a city and the strong opposition from political
and economic leaders may completely bar implementation. Therefore, a subsequent
68
CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-7 (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). A
“Proposed Project will have a ‘material, cumulative adverse impact’ on the health or the
environment of the community” when the operation would cause a public nuisance. Id. For
the purpose of the Cincinnati Ordinance, the Examiner can find a public nuisance if there is a
reasonable basis to determine that the proposed project will, “1) cause an excess cancer risk;
2) cause an excess risk of acute health effects; 3) cause an excess risk in the event of an
accident; or 4) constitute an Air Pollution Nuisance as defined in OAC 3745-15-07.” Id.
69

E-mail from Rocky Merz, Pub. Info. Officer, Cincinnati Health Dep’t, to David
Crowley, Vice Mayor of the City of Cincinnati (May 27, 2009, 11:46 EST) (on file with
author); E-mail from Fariba Nourian, Citizen of Cincinnati, to Cincinnati City Council (May
27, 2009, 10:30 EST) (on file with author); Letter from Tony Stieritz, Dir., Catholic Soc.
Action, to David Crowley, Vice Mayor of the City of Cincinnati (May 26, 2009) (on file with
author).
70

Letter from Ellen G. van der Horst, President and CEO, Cincinnati USA Regional
Chamber, to Mark L. Mallory, Mayor of the City of Cincinnati (June 16, 2009) (on file with
author). The Cincinnati USA Regional Chamber so strongly opposed the Ordinance that it
created an Environmental Justice Taskforce to conduct studies regarding the financial impact
and the economic burdens the regulations would cause. Id.
71
Memorandum from Milton Dohoney, Jr., Cincinnati City Manager, to the Economic
Development Committee (Sept. 9, 2009) (on file with author).
72

Brian M. Babb, Update on Cincinnati Environmental Justice Ordinance, KEATING
MUETHING & KLEKAMP PLL (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.kmklaw.com/news-publications136.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2010).
73
Environmental justice considerations include fair treatment under environmental laws
and freedom from disproportionately high and adverse health of environmental effects.
CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-1 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).
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analysis of the effectiveness with which the Ordinance will achieve the goals of
environmental justice, followed by an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages
of environmental regulations at different levels of government within the federal
system, will provide how the provisions of the Ordinance can be most effectively
and efficiently implemented.
III. REGULATING AND ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE THROUGH THE STATES
The main goal of environmental justice is to provide equitable enforcement of
environmental statutes and to implement procedures to ensure the fair distribution of
the burdens of pollution among all people.74 However, as the above overview of the
government’s handling of environmental justice issues shows, the Supreme Court’s
strict judicial standards, lax administrative agency guidelines, and strategies fail to
enforce, ensure, and implement procedures necessary to achieving environmental
justice. The Ordinance represents a new form of environmental justice policy that
presents a cause of action and remedy to environmental justice plaintiffs.
Additionally, the Ordinance provisions address the goals of environmental justice
and ensure enforcement of environmental justice regulations through a formal and
legally enforceable regulation. However, a variety of practical, legal, and policy
issues prevent the Ordinance from providing an efficient means for implementing
environmental justice regulations. Nonetheless, if adopted at the state level by
administrative agencies, the Ordinance serves as an effective model for future
environmental justice regulations.
A. The Cincinnati Ordinance as Model for Environmental Justice Regulations
A true environmental justice policy must address the goals of the environmental
justice movement—to equitably enforce environmental statutes and implement
procedures to ensure environmental justice results.75 Numerous commentators,
advocates, and critics have analyzed and written about the necessary components of
an effective environmental justice policy,76 but a comprehensive study conducted by
the National Academy of Public Administration (“the Academy”) identified that the
primary reason government agencies fail to achieve environmental justice is because
74

Mank, supra note 15, at 425 n.1.

75

See Environmental Justice, supra note 3 (the goals of the environmental justice
movement are based on the EPA’s definition of environmental justice). The proposed
Environmental Justice Acts in the early 1990s provide an example of an environmental justice
policy that some commentators believe would have failed to achieve the movement’s goals.
Hasler, supra note 17, at 445. Specifically, critics claimed that both statutes failed to provide
equitable protection from environmental injustice, did not ensure the immediate response of
government enforcement, and did not include provisions for meaningful redress. Id. Whereas
the Ordinance provides immediate redress by using a nuisance standard, the Environmental
Justice Acts would not have taken effect until at least three years after enactment, in order to
give the EPA and the Department of Health and Human Services time to conduct research and
collect data. Id. at 453. The proposed acts also would not have achieved equality because
they only provided protection for the one hundred counties with the highest total weight of
toxic chemicals. Id. at 447. Finally, although the proposed acts would have implemented
moratoria on building new polluting facilities, they did not create a cause of action to provide
recourse for other environmental justice situations. Id. at 458.
76

See generally Hasler, supra note 17; Yang, supra note 6; Rechtschaffen, supra note 51;
Mank, supra note 15.
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their policies do not include measures that keep the agencies accountable for their
actions.77
By isolating government accountability as the most important aspect of an
environmental justice policy, the Academy concluded that government or agency
regulations will not be effective unless they incorporate gathering data, providing
opportunities for meaningful public participation, and other administrative
procedures to ensure equitable enforcement into their provisions.78 Each of these
three additional components will enable a government agency to internally track its
progress towards achieving environmental justice. Furthermore, these factors will
also increase government transparency, and the public will be able to hold the
governmental entity or agency accountable for any shortcomings towards achieving
its environmental justice goals.79 The Ordinance, unlike other government policies,
addresses each of these factors and stands as an effective model for future
environmental justice regulations.
1. Gathering Data
Gathering data regarding local pollution rates and their impact on human health
and making such information publically available increases an agency’s
accountability by providing it with the information to assess the accuracy and
effectiveness of its environmental justice policies.80 The Ordinance requires the
collection of data in several ways. First, each permit application must include a list
of substances to be emitted or stored by the facility and an accident risk analysis.81
Also, the Examiner may consider various sources of data relating to pollution
burdens, disease rates, increases in emissions, cancer risks, and the general health,
safety, and welfare of the community in which the proposed project is going to be
located.82 All the information collected must be made available to the public for
review,83 thereby providing the city with data to assess the effectiveness of its
policies. Furthermore, the Ordinance requires the city to publish bi-annual city-wide

77

NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN EPA PERMITTING: REDUCING
POLLUTION IN HIGH-RISK COMMUNITIES IS INTEGRAL TO THE AGENCY’S MISSION (2001)
(hereinafter “ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN EPA PERMITTING”); NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN.,
MODELS FOR CHANGE: EFFORTS BY FOUR STATES TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 11
(2002) (hereinafter “MODELS FOR CHANGE”); see also Ann E. Goode & Suellen Keiner,
Managing for Results to Enhance Government Accountability and Achieve Environmental
Justice, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 289, 308 (2004).
78

Goode & Keiner, supra note 77, at 294.

79

Id.

80

Id. at 302-03.

81

CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-5-A (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).
But note that this does not require disclosures of the amounts of substances to be stored, or
projected amounts of emissions, which would provide more detailed data with which to
calculate the impact that a proposed project would have on the surrounding community.
82

CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-9 (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).

83

CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-13 (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).
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pollution reports84 that will ensure the city does, in fact, assess the effectiveness of
its policies.
2. Providing Meaningful Public Participation
Complete and prompt public notification of permitting actions facilitates
accountability by building a relationship of trust with the public and empowering the
public to identify environmental justice issues.85 However, the Academy concluded
that only providing legal notices or making information available at a government
office fails to yield meaningful public participation.86 Rather, “culturally competent
outreach, including language translation and explanation of scientific and technical
issues, meetings . . . [and] longer comment periods,” has greater success of
generating meaningful public participation.87
The Ordinance provides measures for prompt public notification of permitting
activities, but it should be modified to provide more complete notification. The
Ordinance requires the Office of Environmental Quality to send written notice within
ten days of the application being completed and requires the City to make the
application information available to the general public within ten days following the
written notice being sent.88 Although the Ordinance provides prompt written
notification,89 the public would have more complete access to the information if the
Ordinance included opportunities for open discussion in public meetings, or
provided assistance interpreting the data. Adding those measures to the existing
public notice provision in the Ordinance would increase public participation and
increase the City’s accountability to a well-informed public.90
3. Ensuring Equitable Enforcement
Relying on methods similar to data collection and public participation, the
Academy found that agencies and governments can improve and ensure equitable
enforcement by taking advantage of the local community’s knowledge of the
facilities and concerns, implementing enforcement actions that include monetary
84

CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-21 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). In
making the application information available to the public, the Ordinance applies some of the
Academy’s recommendations for improving public access to pollution information.
Specifically, the Academy recommends using the Internet and other low-cost or no-cost media
outlets to disseminate information regarding permitting actions. Goode & Keiner, supra note
77, at 304. The Cincinnati Ordinance incorporates this suggestion by requiring public notice
through the City’s website “of all projects that are subject to the provisions of [the
Ordinance].” CINCINNATI OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-13 (2010) (effective Feb. 1,
2011).
85

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN EPA PERMITTING, supra note 77, at 73.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-13 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).

89

Id.

90

The Ordinance allows the Office of Environmental Quality to develop additional
administrative policies and procedures not already contained within the Ordinance.
CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-25 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).
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penalties, and evaluating the results of such enforcement measures.91 The Academy
recommends using proactive methods of community outreach, similar to those
recommended for facilitating meaningful public participation, to access community
knowledge and build a relationship with the affected community.92 The Ordinance
provides both civil and criminal enforcement procedures with monetary penalties,93
but its public participation and data collection provisions do not require community
outreach and therefore restricts access to community knowledge that would help the
Examiner make permitting decisions. However, by revising the public notice
provisions of the Ordinance to include procedures for community outreach, rather
than merely notification, it will better ensure equitable enforcement of its provisions.
B. Centralization-Decentralization Debate Applied to Environmental Justice
Regulations 94
Considering the minimal alterations and improvements suggested above, the
Ordinance provides effective and mandatory environmental regulations to ensure the
enforcement of environmental justice policies. However, an analysis of the
Ordinance and its development within the centralization-decentralization debate of
environmental regulations shows that the Ordinance will be more effective if
incorporated into state administrative agency regulations, rather than as a municipal
ordinance.
1. The Centralization-Decentralization Debate
Within the field of environmental law, federal statutes and federal agency
regulations govern the majority of environmental regulations.95 Although the
91

Goode & Keiner, supra note 77, at 307; MODELS FOR CHANGE, supra note 77, at 11.

92

MODELS FOR CHANGE, supra note 77, at 12.

93
CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-27 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). A
civil compliance order will be issued on the basis of any information that indicates a person
violated the Ordinance. Id. The order may include revocation of a permit, and may include a
fine not in excess of $15,000. Id. Similarly, if the violator does not comply with the terms of
the order, the Director of the Office of Environmental Quality may revoke the permit and
issue a fine not in excess of $15,000 for each day of noncompliance. Id. Additionally, any
knowing violation, omission, or material misrepresentation is a misdemeanor in the first
degree and subject to a fine. Id.
94
See generally Weiland, supra note 57. “The . . . centralization/decentralization debate
influences the many doctrines that compose intergovernmental relations in the United States,”
such as preemption and just environmental law. Id. at 249. The debate has also been applied
to land use regulations under a theory entitled the “quiet revolution.” See generally Sara C.
Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the
States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231 (2008). The quiet revolution argues, “[the] states should take
back their police power to regulate extralocal issues in a manner that maintained . . . the
existing land use system and the respect for local autonomy.” Id. at 231-32. Environmental
justice is closely related to both fields of environmental law and land use regulation. Based on
those similarities and the factor of intergovernmental relations implicit in any regulatory
scheme within a federalist system of government, this Note applies the centralizationdecentralization debate to the discussion of the Ordinance and the environmental justice
movement.
95

ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 259 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997).
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environmental justice movement is closely related to the environmental regulations
and policies, it does not follow that environmental justice policies should likewise be
centralized through a national statute and federal agency control. During the
development of environmental regulations in the 1970s, lawmakers and politicians
analogized social and political movements as wars—such as the war on poverty—to
describe the widespread need for reform in areas such as poverty and the
environment.96 Therefore, widespread concern for the environment during this time
motivated the federal lawmakers to use the full scope of their regulatory authority to
reverse the trend of environmental degradation.97
Aside from the historical and political rationales for national environmental
regulations, national control of environmental regulations was and still is justified by
two main practical considerations. First, the federal government caused many of the
large-scale and panic-inducing environmental problems—such as nuclear power
plants, dams, and overgrazing of federal lands—through federal programs.98 As
such, it is within the federal government’s scope of authority and its responsibility to
change environmental policies.99 Second, federal environmental regulations are
justified because environmental problems are inherently interstate—pollution will
inevitably cross state lines into and out of numerous jurisdictions.100 However, the
actions that cause pollution and environmental problems originate on a local level
and vary depending on local conditions.101 Therefore, there is also an argument to be
made that environmental problems are inherently local, and can be more efficiently
regulated at the local level of government.102
Developing environmental justice regulations involves similar considerations of
nationally centralized or locally decentralized regulations. Just like environmental
issues, environmental justice issues vary widely depending on the local natural,
social, political, cultural, economic conditions. Requiring such specific problems to
be handled by through a cumbersome federal bureaucratic chain of command would
limit the government’s ability to respond quickly in order to protect residents from
environmental hazards and preserve their quality of life.103 Furthermore, the federal
96

Id. at 260. The greater political context of the 1970s, including great unrest over the
Vietnam War, encouraged lawmakers to analogize social movements to wars and to use the
full scope of federal power to fix domestic problems. Id. By analogizing domestic
environmental problems to military conflicts, lawmakers could introduce sweeping national
policies and “boast that they had won the fight before it began.” Id.
97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id. A popular mantra in the 1970s described the interstate nature of the environment
and pollution as, “‘[e]verything is connected to everything else.’” Id.
101

Id. at 263.

102

Id. at 259.

103
Id. at 263. The complex bureaucratic chain of command refers not only to people and
agencies involved, but also the hierarchy of different written regulations. Id. For example,
resolving any single environmental issue requires looking at the EPA regulations, any agency
guidance documents that interpret the relevant regulation, and then any additionally applicable
state plans, policies, strategies, or regulations. Id.
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“command and control regulatory strategy”104 imposes controls on localities in spite
of local wishes, squanders resources, and cannot adequately account for wide
disparities in local conditions.105 However, state or local governments have a more
limited jurisdiction, and would be able to “assess particular problems as they arise
and decide what should be done, just as sensible human beings handle issues that
arise in their lives.”106 Nonetheless, extreme local control of environmental justice
issues at the municipal level has its shortcomings too, which relate primarily to the
inefficiencies that would arise from having a wide variety of environmental justice
policies within a very small geographic area. Each argument in favor of centralized
environmental regulations represents a disadvantage of decentralized regulations,
and vice versa. But, as the following comparison of arguments for both centralized
and decentralized environmental regulations shows, the advantages of both can be
amplified while the disadvantages can be mitigated by implementing regulations at
the state level.
2. Centralization
Centralizing environmental regulations at the national level has numerous
advantages. The primary arguments in favor of centralizing environmental
regulations in the federal government are that it: (1) overcomes problems associated
with negative externalities; (2) results in a predictable and uniform regulatory
environment; (3) provides consideration for varied interests through the political
process; (4) overcomes lack of capacity experienced at lower levels of governments,
and (5) it furthers environmental regulations as a national moral imperative.107
First, centralizing environmental justice regulations minimizes negative
externalities suffered by a local government when pollution crosses into and out of
neighboring jurisdictions.108 Negative externalities occur when one agent’s actions
impose costs on others, such as when pollution from one city travels to another.109
As a municipal ordinance, the Ordinance ensures that proposed projects within
Cincinnati will not contribute to disproportionately high pollution levels within its
boundaries, but it cannot control the negative externalities caused by pollution or
permitting decisions in neighboring cities. These negative externalities undermine
the purpose of the Ordinance “to provide Environmental Justice to all citizens of
Cincinnati.”110 Implementing the Ordinance at a higher level of government will
internalize the problem of negative externalities by enforcing environmental justice
regulations across municipal jurisdictional boundaries.
Secondly, centralized environmental justice regulations will also provide the
benefits of a uniform regulatory environment.111 Uniform regulations help achieve
104
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106

Id.
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Weiland, supra note 57, at 238-44.
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Id. at 239.
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Id.
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CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-3 (2002) (effective July 24, 2009).
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Weiland, supra note 57, at 241-42.
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environmental justice by establishing a baseline for fair treatment and meaningful
participation in local permitting decisions while allowing industries to operate within
a predictable regulatory structure.112 Uniformity and predictability results in lower
costs for businesses, an issue that is especially relevant in low-income environmental
justice communities. In Cincinnati, industries in the Chamber expressed concern
that the costs of complying with the Ordinance would deter economic development
within the City.113 Any amount of regulation will increase business costs and burden
taxpayers, and the administrative procedures in the Ordinance and regulatory are no
exception.114 However, imposing the same permitting requirements on businesses
throughout the state or country will prevent an individual city from losing businesses
to neighboring municipalities because of stricter permit requirements and allow a
greater number of taxpayers to share the financial burden.
Thirdly, although centralized regulations result in uniform regulations, those
uniform regulations represent a greater variation of interests through the political
process.115 Whereas powerful interests can influence and even dominate local
politics, the influence of special interests is diluted at the state and federal levels of
government.116 At a higher level of government, small environmental justice
112

Id. at 242-43.

113

Letter from Ellen G. van der Horst, supra note 70. Specifically, one Cincinnati
chemical corporation noted that “the Ordinance would impede our ability to react to changes
in the global specialty chemicals market.” Letter from Gregory E. Pflum, Vice President and
CAO, Cognis Corp., to David Crowley, Vice Mayor of the City of Cincinnati (May 13, 2009)
(on file with author).
114

Memorandum from Milton Dohoney, Jr., supra note 71. The City Council agreed that
the Ordinance would have an impact on economic development in the City, but minimized the
magnitude of its effects and argued that the increased reputation for sustainability and
livability would attract new businesses and residents. Id.
115

Weiland, supra note 57, at 241.
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Id. The ability for special interests to dominate local politics can be further illustrated
by a number of “syndrome behaviors.” OUR BACKYARD, supra note 13, at 107. Syndrome
behaviors represent common categories of actions “taken when citizens are affected, or think
they are going to be affected, by environmental hazards and actions by politicians who are
forced to respond to citizens’ concerns.” Id. Syndrome behaviors are particularly relevant in
environmental justice, because people rely on others—politicians, legislators, and government
officials—to offer protection from environmental hazards. Id. at 110. Several of the most
common syndrome behaviors are: Not In My Backyard (NIMBY); Not In My Term Of Office
(NIMTOO); Not In My Election Year (NIMEY); Put It In Their Backyard (PIITBY); and
Why In My Back Yard (WIMBY). Id. at 111-12. Each syndrome behavior results in response
to different situations. For example, NIMBY occurs in politically proactive communities,
usually those that are economically affluent, whose residents fight strongly against polluting
facilities in their communities. Id. at 112. NIMTOO tends to occur in politically active
communities when a politician avoids the opposing desires of businesses and residents by
delaying passing laws, or refusing to pass laws, while in office. Id. at 114. NIMEY, on the
other hand, has little do with the political activity of the community, but more with timing in
relation to re-election. Id. at 117. With election or re-election on the horizon, many decisions
are heavily politicized and “motivated by the [politician’s] desire to survive and advance
politically.” Id. The PIITBY syndrome response is the most likely to lead to environmental
injustice in low-income and minority communities. Id. at 118. When politically active and
affluent communities make strong NIMBY arguments, politically weak communities are often
the chosen location for hazardous or polluting facilities. Id. Finally, a WIMBY syndrome
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advocates and grassroots organizations can join together and have a greater chance
of defeating powerful political and economic interests. Although the Cincinnati City
Council was able to overcome opposition from industries, the Ordinance barely
survived the four-year long process.
Fourthly, centralized environmental justice regulations will also solve the
problem of a city’s lack of capacity to fund the environmental justice regulations.117
Estimated to cost $125,000, the Chamber argued that the City could not afford to
implement the regulations in light of a projected budget deficit.118 The Chamber’s
prediction came true, and the City Council had to formally postpone implementing
the Ordinance due to a lack of funding in the City’s budget.119 Arguably, increasing
the scope of environmental justice regulations at the state or federal level would
increase administrative costs. However, it would also increase the tax base and avoid
the Chamber’s primary concern of deterring business growth because of its stricter
permit requirements.
Finally, centralized environmental justice regulations will strengthen the
movement by establishing it as a national moral imperative.120 Environmental issues
used to be perceived as problems that only worried affluent citizens, but there is
widespread support for environmental issues.121 In Cincinnati, numerous community
organizations and concerned citizens expressed widespread support for the
Ordinance.122 As with the environmental and civil rights movements, centralized
regulations provided plaintiffs with legal remedies—something still lacking for the
environmental justice movement. By providing legal remedies and strengthening
environmental justice as a national moral imperative, centralized regulations will
help achieve the goals of environmental justice—to ensure equitable enforcement of
environmental laws for all people.
response is most common in the low-income and minority communities, which tend to be
“more reactive than proactive in their responses to decisions concerning environmental
hazards.” Id. at 119. With the success of environmental justice policies so closely tied to
political syndrome responses, it is necessary to dilute the effects of those political whims by
centralizing environmental justice regulations.
117

Weiland, supra note 57, at 240.
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Letter from Ellen G. van der Horst, supra note 70. The Chamber President further
noted:
At a time when the City of Cincinnati faces a projected $40 million budget deficit,
creating a new unfunded mandate detrimental to business growth could only have a
negative impact. Without significant business growth, the City’s tax revenues will
likely decrease and it will become more difficult to reduce the City’s projected deficit.
Id.
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Babb, supra note 72. The current effective date, February 1, 2011, remains conditional
upon adequate funding within the City budget. Id.
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Weiland, supra note 57, at 243.
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Id. at 244. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Reagan
Administration’s failure to dismantle it, is evidence of generally widespread concern for
environmental issues. Id.
122

See, supra note 69.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss1/8

22

2011]

THE CINCINNATI ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORDINANCE

245

3. Decentralization
Alternatively, proponents of decentralization argue that local governments are
best suited to control environmental law and policy because: 1) environmental
problems are place-specific, 2) it encourages responsiveness between government
and its citizens, 3) it encourages experimentation and development of innovative
policies, 4) it allows for flexibility in handling complex problems, and 5) it
encourages inter-jurisdictional competition.123
The main argument in favor of decentralized environmental regulations is that
environmental concerns are place-specific, varying based on the climate and
topography of the area.124
Beyond physical geographic characteristics,
environmental justice issues can also vary depending on the cultural, economic, and
historical characteristics of the region,125 such that uniform centralized regulations
are ineffective.126 The Ordinance addresses these place-specific issues by providing
opportunities for local public participation, where concerned and informed residents
can establish the context for the problem.127 Furthermore, the Ordinance requires the
proposed project’s permit application to include risk-analysis data for the
surrounding area within a one-mile radius, allowing the Examiner to fully consider
the impact of the proposed project given the very specific environmental, social, and
economic factors of a given neighborhood or community.128 The Ordinance
incorporates another tier of place-specific regulations by requiring bi-annual research
studies of air quality within the City of Cincinnati.129 By basing permitting decisions
on individual public concerns, community-level, and city-wide data, the Ordinance
allows for its provisions to be adapted to a wide variety of environmental justice
issues based on location. Therefore, if expanded to a state-wide regulation, the
123

Id. at 244-48.
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Id.
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For instance, Cincinnati’s environmental justice problems have to do mostly with air
pollution from industrial manufacturing. CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041
(2010) (effective Feb 1, 2011). The environmental justice issues in South Camden, New
Jersey, concerned issues of air pollution as well. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t
of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001). The Warren County protests and Love Canal
tragedy illustrate another form of environmental justice issue, dealing primarily with
hazardous waste issues. OUR BACKYARD, supra note 13, at 6; Beck, supra note 4. Finally, the
history of colonization and land being taken away from indigenous people provides the basis
for environmental justice organizations in the American Southwest. NOVOTNY, supra note 2,
at 28-31. These examples do not exhaust the different variations of environmental justice
issues. A national environmental justice policy would have to address all of those issues
equally, or else fail to adequately achieve environmental justice throughout the country. Such
a regulation, however, would almost certainly be overwhelmingly complex to the point of
being ineffective.
126

Weiland, supra note 57, at 244-45.
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CINCINNATI OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-13 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).
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See CINCINNATI OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-5-B (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011)
(defining “community” to mean the area surrounding the Proposed Project encompassing a
one-mile radius).
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CINCINNATI OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-21 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).
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Ordinance would still incorporate its adaptability to specific situations by basing all
permitting decisions on the data collected during the application process and other
administrative procedures.130
Secondly, decentralized regulations will encourage government responsiveness
to problems of environmental justice. Encouraging responsiveness between a local
government and its citizens is based on the idea that it encourages the spirit of liberty
by bringing the government within the people’s reach.131 Environmental justice is an
issue that impacts people’s everyday quality of life, and cannot be achieved unless
government provides a forum for communication. The Ordinance includes public
participation provisions that provide administrative procedures to facilitate
communication and responsiveness between government and its citizens.132 Public
meetings and notification procedures similar to those in the Ordinance are common
at the local level, but could also be conducted by a state agency. Therefore, even if
extrapolated and expanded to a state agency, the Ordinance will retain the benefit of
making a government responsive to its people.
Thirdly, decentralization allows local governments to develop and adopt
innovative policies.133 The Ordinance is a new and innovative policy that developed
within a municipal “laboratory” of experimentation.134 By working on a smaller
scale and within a local government, the passion and dedication of a few people can
create an entirely new policy and reform an entire area of law.135 The Ordinance
began as the special project of the vice-mayor of Cincinnati, and his hard work
created an entirely new kind of ordinance.136 Therefore, providing an innovative
solution to the problem of environmental justice, the logical next step for the
Ordinance is to integrate it into either state or national agency regulations.
Fourthly, decentralized regulations allow for flexibility.137 The idea of flexibility
within a local government is contrasted with the stereotypical rigidity of bureaucratic
institutions that result from cumbersome chains of command and fixed standard
operating procedures.138 Environmental justice issues, however, are very complex
130
CINCINNATI OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-15 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). As a
state-wide ordinance, the permitting decisions would still be based on the risk-analysis data
provided in the application, and it would retain a provision for municipalities to periodically
update their own data through comprehensive studies. Of course, adapting the Ordinance to
the state level would require creating additional administrative positions to collect data, but
those decisions could be made by the agency, and would not alter the provisions of the
Ordinance.
131

Weiland, supra note 57, at 246.
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CINCINNATI OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-13 (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).
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Crowley, supra note 9. The Ordinance was the first of its kind in the country, and exists
almost exclusively because of the passion and perseverance of Vice Mayor Crowley. Id. He
fought for the passage of the Ordinance for four years against strong opposition from the
Cincinnati business community. Id.
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and incorporate a wide range of variations that require flexibility, but the Ordinance
contains specific provisions that require regulatory flexibility, rather than simply
relying on the flexible character of local government. For instance, the Ordinance
allows for flexibility by requiring continual collection of data from each permit
application and review of each application.139 Additionally, instead of setting
uniform minimum or maximum standards, the Ordinance applies a nuisance standard
to review permitting decisions.140 Therefore, because the Ordinance contains
specific provisions that require regulatory flexibility, the Ordinance could be adopted
and centralized at a state agency without compromising the benefit of decentralized
regulations their ability to handle complex environmental justice issues.
The last argument in favor of a local decentralized environmental justice policy
is that it will encourage interjurisdictional competition.141 The phenomenon of
interjurisdictional competition is predicated on the theory that individuals can vote
for government services either through their words or actions.142 Thus, different
communities or jurisdictions would adopt different regulations based on the desires
of the people. Although this option could also result in a given jurisdiction having
no environmental justice regulations, the case of the Ordinance shows that in a small
enough jurisdiction, one person or a small group of people can influence the course
of local regulations. Furthermore, interjurisdictional competition combined with the
ability of local governments to innovate new regulations would allow the Ordinance,
as a model, to be changed and improved to suit each jurisdiction and its needs.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current regime of environmental justice policies and remedies are
insufficient to achieve the goals of the environmental justice movement. Throughout
the 1990s, the federal government resisted incorporating environmental justice
policies into the federal statutes and the common law of the courts. The executive
branch and its administrative agencies proved more willing to address environmental
justice concerns, but executive orders and agency strategies are only enforced at the
discretion of the agency and place no binding requirements on the agencies.
Therefore, the primary shortcoming of current environmental justice policies at the
federal, state, and local levels is that there is no statutory mandate that requires
agencies or municipalities to implement and enforce environmental justice goals.
Similarly, agency strategies that lack the force of law leave plaintiffs to pursue
environmental justice claims under environmental or civil rights laws, whose strict
139

CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-15 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).
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Id. A nuisance determination is based on the review of facts specific to each case,
rather than a pre-set and rigid standard operating procedure and the examiner will only issue a
permit if he determines that “a Proposed Project will pose a material, cumulative, adverse
impact on the health of the environment of a community.” Id.
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Weiland, supra note 57, at 247.
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Id. A “public choice” model of interjurisdictional competition shows that citizens can
use their voices to customize the mix of services provided by the government, and can leave a
jurisdiction in order to move to a community that has services to suit individual preferences.
Id. at 247. Although the public choice model yields socially desirable results, it will also give
rise to jurisdictions that care little about environmental protection. Id. It follows that in such
jurisdictions, environmental justice issues would be most severe, yet the local government
would be the lease responsive.
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standards typically bar recovery. To actually achieve environmental justice, the
states must adopt regulations that establish mandatory requirements for
administrative agencies to follow, and that provide legal remedies for environmental
justice plaintiffs.
The Ordinance from Cincinnati presents a new model for environmental justice
regulations because it provides a formal legal remedy for environmental justice
claims. Furthermore, analyzing the Ordinance within the centralizationdecentralization debate shows that the regulation will be most effectively
implemented at the state level. Implementing the Ordinance at the state level is ideal
because it is neither completely centralized nor decentralized, and can therefore
maximize the benefits of each. By passing statutes like the Ordinance, state
legislatures can achieve environmental justice by empowering their administrative
agencies to regulate the fair treatment of all people under environmental laws.
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